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Abstract
This paper quantitatively investigates the scope for improving welfare by making
aspects of the unemployment insurance (UI) system depend on the state of the business
cycle. A particular focus is the Canadian system of “Employment Insurance” (EI),
which is designed in such a way that the generosity of benefits depends on the state of
the macroeconomy.
Simulations of a life-cycle model with heterogeneous agents and search frictions
confirm the expectation that optimal UI systems are characterized by a substantial
increase in generosity during recessions, when adverse labour market conditions reduce
the importance of moral hazard while increasing the need for consumption insurance.
It turns out, however, that the welfare improvements resulting from this sort of
temporal differentiation of benefits are extremely small. The insurance against business
cycle effects inherent in the Canadian EI system is welfare enhancing when considered
in isolation; this insurance effect is, however, dominated by the welfare implications of
the inter-regional redistribution effected by the system.
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1 Introduction
There has been increasing interest recently in the benefits of making the generosity of
the unemployment insurance (UI) system depend on the current state of the business cycle
and current labour market conditions. The key to designing an efficient UI system is to find
the right trade-off between the consumption insurance that a generous system provides and
the moral hazard it induces. A wide range of policies that let benefits follow time-dependent
profiles have been studied.1 Tatsiramos and van Ours (2012) provide an up-to-date survey.
The basic idea underlying the time-varying benefits that are the focus of this paper is that
during recessions, unemployment is high but the labour market is slow. This means that on
the one hand, making benefits more easily available can substantially improve consumption
insurance, while at the same time the effect of such a measure on overall unemployment is
likely to be lower than during a boom, as the chances of re-employment are low anyway,
leaving less scope for moral hazard.
This type of time-varying UI scheme has been proposed by Kiley (2003) and Sa´nchez
(2008) in a repeated moral hazard framework similar to Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997).
Andersen and Svarer (2010) use a Mortensen-Pissarides search model to show that an optimal
system would be substantially more generous than the US system during recessions. Kroft
and Notowidigdo (2010) find similar results in a model with stochastic wage offers similar to
Shimer and Werning (2007), while Landais et al. (2010) present a model with sticky wages.
Mitman and Rabinowich (2011) emphasize that optimal benefits may follow more complex
paths over the business cycle. They argue that UI systems should become less generous over
the course of a recession to speed up recovery and be pro-cyclical overall. Another possible
reason for pro-cyclical benefits may be the requirement to balance the government budget
every period as discussed in Andersen and Svarer (2011). Jung and Kuester (2011) extend
the analysis to a wider range of policy options including vacancy subsidies and layoff taxes.
1The aspect that has received the most attentions is how benefits should depend on the duration of the
unemployment spell. See Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and the literature that followed.
2
Due to the complexity of the policy problem at hand, theoretical models of time-varying
unemployment insurance regularly incorporate strong assumptions that may limit applicat-
ibity of the results in a real-world context. For example, all the papers mentioned above
assume hand-to-mouth consumption and therefore rule out the possibility that households
self-insure through saving. It is one of the main contributions of this paper to examine
business-cycle dependent UI in a more realistic general-equilibrium setting with fully opti-
mizing agents.
The Canadian Employment Insurance (EI) program is an interesting example of a system
that does implement counter-cyclical generosity, as it includes mechanisms to make benefits
more easily available when the unemployment rate is high. Specifically, benefit durations
depend on the number of hours worked during a qualifying period. In regions with high
unemployment, fewer hours are required to qualify for a given benefit duration and the
maximum durations are longer. The replacement ratio does not depend on labour market
conditions, though.2 While these features of the system are often interpreted as a means of
interprovincial redistribution, they do have business-cycle implications if the unemployment
rate varies enough over time.
There is a small but growing literature that investigates the effects of extensions to benefit
durations during recessions empirically. Farber and Valetta (2013) and Rothstein (2011) use
data from the American Current Population Survey (CPS) to show that extended benefit
durations lead to small but significant extensions in unemployment durations. Schmieder
et al. (2012) find similar results in German data.3 Using a different approach based on a
simulated structural model with fully optimizing households whose productivity depends on
2The UI system in the US also employs a mechanism that can lead to automatic increases in benefit
durations during recessions. “Extended Benefits,” which increase the benefit duration by 13 or 20 weeks
beyond the usual 26 weeks, are triggered by a combination of high unemployment rates and strong increases
in unemployment in a state.
Another country where benefit durations depend on the regional unemployment rate is Poland. However,
because extended durations are triggered by high unemployment relative to the national average and only
with long lags, the Polish system is unlikely to provide particularly effective insurance against business cycle
effects. See Sienkiewicz (2011).
3Even though benefit durations do not vary with labour market conditions in Germany, the authors are
able to exploit the fact that older individuals are entitled to extended benefits.
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their employment history, Nakajima attributes almost a third of the rise in US unemployment
during the 2009-2011 period to extended benefit durations.
This paper investigates the scope for improving welfare by adjusting UI generosity over
the business cycle. This is done quantitatively using a general equilibrium model with
overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents that is calibrated to resemble the Canadian
economy. I consider the efficiency effects of changing replacement ratios and benefit durations
over the business cycle. Moreover, I investigate the welfare and distributional implications
of the fact that by design, the Canadian EI system varies benefits not only over time, but
also across regions.
The plan for this paper is as follows. I first briefly introduce relevant aspects of the
Canadian EI system. Sections 3 and 4 describe the model and discuss its calibration and
simulation. The main results are presented in section 5. First, the welfare implications of a
range of possible UI policies are discussed in the context of the aggregate Canadian economy.
Optimal UI policies with and without time-varying benefit schedules are derived for several
classes of systems. Then the model is calibrated to match the characteristics of groups of
regions that are treated differently under the current EI system to investigate the insurance
and distributional properties of the program. The final section of the paper concludes.
2 The Canadian EI System
For the purpose of administering EI, Canada is divided into 58 “EI Economic Regions,”
which are chosen to cover individual labour markets or areas with homogenous labour market
conditions. The geographical definition of these regions has been changed in the past. Figure
1 shows their current configuration, which has been in place since July 2000.
For each of these regions, the 3-months moving average of the seasonally adjusted unem-
ployment rate is used to determine the conditions for the receipt of EI benefits. EI economic
regions are clustered into one of 12 groups based on this unemployment figure (no more
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Figure 1: Employment Insurance Economic Regions
Source: “EI Monitoring and Assessment Report 2011,” Human Resources and Skills Development Canada,
Annex 7.
than 6%, 6% to 7%, 7% to 8%, etc. up to 16% and more).4 The higher the unemployment
rate, the easier it is to qualify for benefits and the longer is the benefit duration. The re-
quired number of hours of work to qualify for benefits ranges from 420 in the 12 months
prior to job loss (in regions with an unemployment rate above 13%) to 700 hours (if the
unemployment rate is 6% or less). The benefit duration increases with the number of hours
worked up to a maximum between 36 weeks in low-unemployment regions and 45 weeks in
4 The official unemployment rates reported and used for this purpose by Human Resources and Skill
Development Canada (HRSDC), the federal agency administering the unemployment insurance program,
differ somewhat from those published by Statistics Canada, even though they are derived from the same
survey. The most important difference is that in contrast to Statistics Canada, HRSDC includes aboriginal
people living on reserves in their calculations. This leads to higher unemployment measures mostly in the
relatively sparsely populated northern parts of the provinces.
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Table 1: Regional Unemployment and Maximum Benefit Duration
hoursa
unemployment rate less or equal
6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% –
420-454 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 28 30 32
455-489 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 26 28 30 32
490-524 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 25 27 29 31 33
525-559 0 0 0 0 0 21 23 25 27 29 31 33
560-594 0 0 0 0 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
595-629 0 0 0 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
630-664 0 0 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
665-699 0 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
700-734 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36
735-769 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36
...
1715-1749 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 45 45 45 45 45
1750-1784 34 36 38 40 42 44 45 45 45 45 45 45
1785-1819 35 37 39 41 43 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
1820- 36 38 40 42 44 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
a number of insurable hours of work during the qualifying period, which is typically
the 52 weeks before job loss
high-unemployment regions. Table 1 shows the relationship between the regional unemploy-
ment rate and maximum benefit duration for a subset of the relevant qualification period
brackets.5
The aspect of the EI system that is most interesting for our purpose is how maximum
benefit durations depend on regional unemployment rates. As can be seen in the last row of
5Even though the requirements are stated in terms of insurable hours, the underlying idea is to model
the system around a 35-hour workweek. The somewhat complicated pattern is as follows: For the same
number of qualifying hours, the maximum benefit duration increases by 2 weeks per extra percentage point
of regional unemployment. For every additional 70 hours (35 hours) of insurable work, the benefit duration
increases by one week if the total number of hours is between 420 and 1,399 (between 1,400 and 1,820). The
minimum number of hours required is 420 in regions with more than 13% unemployment. This minimum
requirement increases by 35 hours for each one-percentage-point drop of local unemployment. No benefit
durations of more than 45 weeks are possible.
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table 1, according to this criterion the EI economic regions can be classified into six groups.
Figure 2: Unemployment Rates across Economic Regions
Source: “EI Monitoring and Assessment Report 2012,” Human Resources and Skills Development Canada,
Annex 1.
Figure 2 reports the official unemployment rates in these regions for 2011-12.6 Clearly,
the wide range of regional unemployment rates over which the generosity of the system
varies has been chosen for a reason. Generally, unemployment rates tend to be higher in the
four Atlantic Provinces Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick and relatively low in the Prairie Provinces Alberta, Saskatchewan and
Manitoba. Within provinces, unemployment rates are typically higher in the northern EI
regions.
EI is financed through contributions, which are adjusted annually. In 2013, the total
contribution rate was 4.51% on earnings up to the maximum insurable amount of $47,400,
6The official unemployment rate in regions 56 to 58, Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, is
25%. Even though Statistics Canada measures the unemployment rates in these territories, the corresponding
component of the Labour Force Survey is deemed experimental.
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which is also adjusted every year.7 This contribution rate is not an ideal indicator of the cost
of UI in Canada, as the EI program does not only provide UI benefits, called regular benefits,
but also parental benefits, sickness benefits and benefits to self-employed fishermen, among
others. The ratios of regular benefits to insurable earnings and total employment income
were 2.70% and 1.71%, respectively, in 2010.8
3 The Model
In any given period t, the economy is in one of two possible macro states st ∈ {0, 1}. In the
bad state s = 0, which will be identified with periods of recession, total factor productivity
(TFP) p(st) is lower and the risk of job loss is higher. The sequence of macro states follows
a Markov process.
3.1 Households
The economy is populated by equally large overlapping generations of heterogeneous
agents. Each individual has a life span of 60 years, corresponding to ages 20 to 79. Important
events include entry into the economy and the labour market at age 20, retirement at age 65
and death at 80 years of age. All agents are identical initially; however, their actual incomes
differ due to the idiosyncratic nature of labour market opportunities, resulting in different
asset levels and consumption possibilities among individuals of the same cohort.
When they first enter the economy, agents are endowed with assets corresponding to
three months of labour income9, but they do not have a job. If an individual is unemployed
in period t, she receives job offers at the rate ω(st). These employment opportunities differ
7The contributions are split between employers and employees. Employers always pay 1.4 times the
employees’ contributions. Since 2006, Quebec has had a different contribution rate, which is somewhat lower
than the federal rate.
8See EI Monitoring and Assessment Report 2012, Annexes 2.18 and 2.19.
9Three months of the income earned by a 20-year-old agent in a job with match quality one and a
reservation wage of zero.
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in productivity and are therefore characterized by different wages.10 Once an agent receives
an acceptable offer, a job is created and production begins in the following period.11 Jobs
last until they are destroyed, which happens at the exogenous state-dependent rate λ(st), or
when the agent reaches her retirement age. After retirement, all agents must rely on assets
and interest income for consumption.
Agents maximize the expected utility derived from consumption during the rest of their
deterministic lifetime, which is assumed to be time separable.
maxEt
[
Ti∑
s=t
βs−tu(cit)
]
, (1)
Here, the index i refers to the individual, Ti is the last period of agent i’s life, β > 0 is a
discount factor and u(cit) is the agent’s instantaneous utility as function of consumption cit.
Agents can save at the prevailing interest rate r, but they are unable to borrow.12 For
every period t of an agent’s life, her financial wealth ait therefore evolves according to the
budget and borrowing constraint
ait+1 = (1 + r)(ait + yit − cit) ≥ 0, (BC)
where yit is any income received during this period, which could be wages or UI benefits.
13
10This mechanism is similar to the one used by Shimer and Werning (2007) and Kroft and Notowidigdo
(2010.)
11Moral hazard arises in the form of individual reservation wages (or equivalently reservation match qual-
ities) that deviate from the social optimum. Agents who decline jobs are not sanctioned by the government.
Pallage and Zimmermann (2005) argue that such sanctions are an important mechanism to control moral
hazard in reality.
12I assume that the interest rate is exogenous, which is probably reasonable approximation for a small
open economy such as Canada. This assumption also simplifies the model considerably compared to a
closed-economy model with time-varying interest rates as in Krusell and Smith (1998).
13See appendix A for further details and a formal description of the household’s problem.
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3.2 Firms and the Labour Market
The labour market is characterized by a Mortensen-Pissarides setting with two-sided
search.14 In order to produce output, firms must first post a vacancy, then wait for a worker
to be matched and negotiate a contract. Unfilled vacancies are associated with a flow cost
of kp(st) that is proportional to TFP. The frequency of matches between workers and firms
is determined by an aggregate matching function. Following the literature on job search, I
assume that this function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale, so that the rate
of job offers unemployed workers receive can be written as ω(st) = ω¯ (θ(st))
η, where θ(st) is
the market tightness as a function of the macro state.
Each firm (or job) produces output for a competitive goods market using capital and
labour as inputs. The production technology is Cobb-Douglas with a capital share of α.
Capital depreciates at the rate δ. The productivity of a worker i on a job j depends on
two factors, the worker’s inherent productivity qit and the quality of the match mij. qit
increases deterministically over an agent’s working life, whereas mij is a measure of how
good the applicant fits the job description. For each match, this match quality mij is drawn
from a lognormal distribution, lnmij ∼ N(−12σ2m, σ2m). mij and qit together determine
the effective labour supplied by worker i on job j, so that the output produced is given
by Yijt = p(st) (mijqit)
1−αKαjt. The capital input Kjt is adjusted optimally every period,
implying Yijt =
(
α
r+δ
) α
1−α p(st)
1
1−αmijqit.
When a firm and a worker meet, Nash bargaining over the part of the labour share
(1− α)Yijt that is paid to the worker as a wage wijt takes place. Once a job is created, the
ratio
wijt
Yijt
stays constant as wages are adjusted to reflect changes in aggregate and individual
productivities.
The market tightness in each state is determined by the condition that the expected value
of a vacancy be zero. In other words, the aggregate vacancy costs in each state are equal to
14See Pissarides (2000).
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the rents earned by firms on jobs created in the same state.15
3.3 The Capital Market and the Government
Capital is supplied elastically by the world capital market at the interest rate r.
The government runs a UI system. It makes payments to eligible working-age individuals.
Moreover, the government provides new agents with their initial asset allocation.16 To pay
for these expenditures, the government levies a proportional tax at a constant rate on all
labour income and transfers, i.e. on wages, UI benefits and the agents’ initial endowment.17
3.4 Long-run Equilibrium
The economy just described is defined to be in a stationary equilibrium if
1. households maximize their utility,
2. firms maximize their profits,
3. given the tightness θt ∈ {θ(0), θ(1)} in each macro state s ∈ {0, 1}, the total expendi-
ture on vacancies equals the expected rents earned on jobs created in this state,
4. the government budget is balanced on average over the business cycle, and
5. the cross-sectional distribution of the population with respect to individual character-
istics is stationary.
15I make the simplifying assumption that the market tightness depends on the current state only. This
neglects the possibility of using the current distribution of household characteristics to predict time-varying
reservation wages more accurately. This simplification is necessary for computational reasons, and is unlikely
to be quantitatively important.
16Note that this means that the tax rate will be positive even if no UI benefits are paid.
17The assumption that all wages and transfers are taxed at the same rate makes it possible to solve the
model independent of tax policy in the case of CRRA preferences.
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4 Calibration and Computation
The model is calibrated to match the aggregate Canadian economy or groups of EI
economic regions as discussed below. Whenever possible, the model economy replicates
features of the Canadian economy between July 2000 and December 2012. This time frame
is chosen to make use of all available microdata on EI economic regions in their current
configuration, which has been in place since July 2000. These 121
2
years are a short time
for measuring business cycle effects, however. This period only includes one relatively short
recession. For this reason, some parameters are calibrated using a longer data period from
January 1976 to June 2013.18 The starting point of this extended period was chosen to
match the introduction of the Labour Force Survey (LFS), the main source of labour market
statistics in Canada, in its present form.
For the calibration exercise, I use a specification of the unemployment insurance system
that resembles the Canadian Employment Insurance. Specifically, benefits are paid after a
waiting period of two weeks at a replacement ratio of 55%. In practice, the duration of the
benefits depends on the prevailing unemployment rate as well as an individual’s number of
hours of insurable work during a qualifying period. Since the work requirement is relatively
low compared to the typical time between two unemployment spells, I assume that everyone
is entitled to receive benefits for the maximum duration available to those with about one
year of full-time employment. Benefit durations depend on whether the unemployment spell
begins during a boom or a recession. For the aggregate economy, average unemployment
rates of 7% to 8% in the good state and 9% to 10% during recessions imply benefit durations
of 40 and 44 weeks, respectively.
The households’ instantaneous utility function u is assumed to exhibit a constant relative
risk aversion of γ = 3. The annual discount rate is 4%. These values are standard in the
macroeconomic literature.
18Note that the this extended period is exactly three times as long as the shorter period – 3712 years or
450 months vs. 12 12 years or 150 months. Recessions are occurring more frequently in the extended period,
accounting for 10% of all quarters compared to 6% in the shorter period.
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The interest rate is set to the average long-term interest rate of 2.4% for the 2000:7 to
2012:12 period.
Individual productivity qit increases deterministically in a piecewise linear fashion with
age to generate lifetime income profiles that resemble those found in household panel data.19
It rises by 60% between ages 20 and 35, and then by another 20 percentage points until
retirement.
The transition probabilities between the macro states are chosen to match the average
frequency and duration of recessions in Canada between 1976:Q1 and 2010:Q2. The average
duration of recessions during this time was 33
4
quarters, with recessions accounting for exactly
10% of the periods.
Productivity is set to be 5.1% lower during recessions, which is the average multifactor
productivity (MFP) differential for the business sector between 1976 and 2009 as reported
by Statistics Canada.20 Production is characterized by a capital share of α = 1
3
and a
depreciation rate of δ = 8% per year.
The matching parameter η is set to 1
2
, in line with the empirical literature. The variance
of match qualities of σ2m = 1% is consistent with the estimates reported in Pollak (2013).
The remaining parameters are calibrated such that the simulated model matches certain
aspects of the data. Specifically, for the calibration of the aggregate economy, the matching
rate ω(1) = 0.323 per period is chosen to generate an unemployment rate of 7.13% in the good
state, equal to the 2000:7-2012:12 average. Market tightness in the high state is normalized
to θ(1) = 1. The matching rate in the low state is then implied to be ω(0) = 0.306, given the
lower market tightness θ(0) = 0.898 resulting from lower profits during recessions. The job
destruction rate during recessions of λ(0) = 1.43% per period implies an average monthly
increase of the unemployment rate of 0.25 percentage points, matching the respective value
for the Canadian economy between 1976:1 and 2012:6. Finally, setting λ(1) = 0.90% gives
an average unemployment duration of 13.8 weeks, equal to the average found in the LFS for
19See e.g. Rupert and Zanella (2010).
20Multifactor productivity is reported at annual frequency, with 2009 being the most recent year available.
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the 2000:7 to 2012:12 period.
The household’s relative bargaining strength is set to 95%. This relatively high value
implies a vacancy cost of k = 0.58 in the model calibrated to the aggregate economy. In
the simulations reported below, market tightness in the good state is normalized to one. In
this case, the vacancy cost is about 5.8% of the average wage. Statistics Canada reports an
actual market tightness of only about 1
6
, however.21 Under this low market tightness, the
corresponding vacancy-cost-to-wage ratio of about one third is consistent with the values
reported in the empirical literature.22
The calibrated parameters for the aggregate scenario are summarized in table 2.23
The model is simulated at a period length of 1
2
month, i.e. at 24 periods per year or
1440 periods in a lifetime. To solve the model for a particular UI system and parameter
constellation, it is necessary to determine the market tightness parameters. This is done as
follows. First, the household’s problem is solved for a given set of tightness parameters. Then
the economy is simulated for a large number of periods. The market tightness parameters
are adjusted based on the simulation results, with the objective to make expected profits in
the firm sector zero. This process is repeated until convergence.24
The household’s problem is solved by recursively finding the value function for each of the
1,440 periods of an agent’s lifetime, starting with the last one. The functions are calculated
on a multidimensional grid, using linear interpolation between grid points.25 The periods
prior to retirement are much more complex to solve because of the larger number of state
variables (assets, employment status, current match quality or benefit level, UI entitlement,
21See series v65958686 and v65958994 for the number of vacancies and unemployed at monthly frequency.
Reliable vacancy data for Canada has only been available since 2011. Please note that the job vacancy rates
reported by Statistics Canada are based on a narrow definition of unemployment and thus differ from the
market tightness concept used in the theoretical literature.
22This is essentially the same vacancy cost that has been used by Landais et al. (2010). Empirical studies
tend to find values between about 10% and 60%, see Barron et al. (1997), Silva and Toledo (2005) and
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
23Further details regarding the data used in the calibration can be found in appendix B.
24 A total of 1,440,000 periods (60,000 years) is simulated with a cohort size of one person and 1,440
overlapping cohorts at any point in time. The convergence criterion used is a deviation of the market
tightness from its predicted value by less than 0.1%.
25Further details on the numerical solution strategy are provided in appendix C.
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Table 2: Calibration: Aggregate Canadian Economy
parameter value
γ relative risk aversion 3.0
β discount rate 0.96a
α capital share 13
δ depreciation rate 8%a
 household’s bargaining power 0.95
η matching parameter 12
σ2m variance of match quality 0.01
matching parameter to data
r interest rate 2.41%a 10-year avg. yield of government bonds
p(0)/q(1) relative productivity in bad state 0.949 drop in MFP during recessions
s = 0→ s = 0 probability of remaining in s = 0 0.956b avg. duration of recessions
s = 1→ s = 1 probability of remaining in s = 1 0.995b avg. time between recessions
matching equilibrium outcome
ω(1) rate of job offers (st = 1) 0.323
b unemployment rate in good state
λ(0) job destruction rate (st = 0) 1.43%
b rise in unemployment during recessions
λ(1) job destruction rate (st = 1) 0.90%
b unemployment duration
k vacancy cost 0.581b zero profit for θ(1) = 1
a per year
b per period ( 124 year)
aggregate state of the economy).26
The finite size of the simulated sample as well the deviation permitted by the convergence
criterion lead to noise in the variables obtained in the simulation runs. Table 3 summarizes
the implications for some variables of interest.
26The most complex value functions just prior to retirement have far over 100,000 nodes (497 asset states,
18 job match levels, 19 benefit levels, 7 UI entitlement levels, 2 employment states and 2 macro states).
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Table 3: Accuracy of selected equilibrium measurements
variable coefficient of variation max. rel. deviation
welfarea,b 2.64 · 10−5 8.38 · 10−5
expected lifetime utilityb 1.55 · 10−4 4.13 · 10−4
θ(0) 8.05 · 10−4 2.43 · 10−3
θ(1) 2.18 · 10−4 7.35 · 10−4
unemployment rate (s = 0) 5.26 · 10−4 1.57 · 10−3
unemployment rate (s = 1) 1.28 · 10−4 5.56 · 10−4
consumption 2.09 · 10−5 5.41 · 10−5
tax rate 1.56 · 10−4 4.66 · 10−4
a utilitarian welfare excluding individuals who have never worked
b measured in consumption units
Note: Coefficient of variation and maximum relative deviation from the
mean found in 200 simulation runs using different starting values.
5 Results
5.1 Efficient Provision of UI over the Business Cycle
Our first objective is to characterize properties of an efficient UI system quantitatively.
This is done by using the calibrated model of the aggregate Canadian economy to perform
a number of simulations under different UI systems and comparing characteristics of the
resulting equilibria.27 The UI systems considered in this exercise have the following prop-
erties: Agents who lose their job are entitled to receive benefits. The benefit duration is
determined at the time of job loss, like in the Canadian system. This duration may be
different depending on whether the spell begins during a good or bad state. There is no
waiting period. The replacement ratio may also depend on the state of the economy. At
any point in time, however, all unemployed individuals receive the same benefit, i.e. the
replacement ratio for an individual may change if the state of the economy changes. The UI
27As the focus of this paper is not UI reform, we will be considering steady states only. For the importance
of transition paths for the welfare implications of UI policy changes, see Mukoyama (2012).
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system is therefore characterized by four parameters, two replacement ratios ρ(s) and two
benefit durations d(s).
The welfare criterion used throughout this paper is utilitarian. I exclude agents from the
welfare measure who have never had a job and are therefore ineligible to receive benefits.28
All welfare changes are reported in consumption-equivalent units.29
Figure 3: UI Generosity and Welfare
0 3 6 9 12 15 18
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
(a) varying Γ(0)
0 3 6 9 12 15 18
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
(b) varying Γ(1)
−18 −15 −12 −9 −6 −3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18
0.985
0.99
0.995
1
(c) varying Γ(0)−Γ(1)
Note: Highest welfare normalized to 1. Generosity Γ(s) is given by replacement ratio times benefit
duration.
Figure 3 summarizes the results obtained in a large number of policy simulations using
scatter plots. In these simulations, the replacement ratios and benefit durations were varied
28Agents who have not yet successfully entered the labour market are excluded for simple practical reasons.
As these individuals are all unemployed but not eligible to receive UI benefits, their welfare tends to depend
strongly on the prevailing market tightness. Generally, these agents favour less generous systems as they
imply a higher matching rate and lower taxes on initial wealth. Depending on the assumptions regarding
young agents’ initial endowment with assets, the impact of the welfare of this group on overall utilitarian
welfare may be anywhere from negligible to dominating. In the absence of a serious calibration of the
average level and cross-sectional variation of initial financial wealth or access to other means of support -
such as social assistance or support from relatives - I decided to remove this group entirely from the welfare
calculation. This allows us to focus on the business-cycle properties of UI rather than distributional effects
regarding young unemployed.
Note that this issue does not arise in an infinite-horizon setting where everybody has an employment history
and is thus potentially eligible to receive UI benefits.
29A reported 1% welfare improvement is equivalent to the welfare change that would have resulted from
a general 1% increase in consumption.
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between 0 and 100% and 0 and 18 months, respectively, for both states of the economy.
The policy variants chosen here are on a grid with intervals of 20 percentage points for
replacement ratios and 3 months for durations.30 Note that this choice of grid implicitly
imposes the constraint that if there is a positive benefit, it is paid at a rate of at least
20% for at least three months. While this restriction is consistent with typical real-world
implementations of UI, it excludes some interesting policies, as will be seen later. For
the purpose of visualizing the welfare patterns that arise, for each state s the replacement
ratio ρ(s) and the benefit duration d(s) are combined into a compound generosity measure
Γ(s) = ρ(s)d(s).31
Figure 3 (b) shows that Γ(1) is actually a rather good predictor of the efficiency of a
UI system. In fact, the upper envelope of the graph suggests that a low to moderate level
of generosity - in our case approximately Γ(1) < 4 - is a necessary condition for attaining
high welfare. Panel (a) of the figure, which shows Γ(0), gives a similar picture, although
varying generosity in the bad state has a quantitatively much smaller effect on welfare, so
that looking at this statistic alone reveals rather little about the likely welfare properties of
a UI scheme.
Finally, panel (c) of figure 3 plots welfare levels by the difference in generosity between
the two states, Γ(0) − Γ(1). The best outcomes are achieved for Γ(0) ≥ Γ(1), which is
consistent with the expectation that it is optimal to provide more generous insurance during
recessions. Note, however, that the quantitative importance of following this rule is really
small.32
Figure 4 presents this information differently, showing the highest levels of efficiency
attainable as a function of Γ(0) and Γ(1). Interestingly, this function has a plateau for lower
30 All distinct scenarios on the grid (ρ(0), ρ(1), d(0), d(1)) ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}2×{0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18}2
are simulated. Some of the 1,764 combinations are redundant, because for a replacement ratio of zero the
benefit duration is irrelevant and vice versa. In total, 961 distinct UI policies are considered.
31A generosity of Γ(s) = 9 could, for example, correspond to a 100% replacement ratio for nine months
or a 50% replacement ratio for 18 months. This is a simple ad-hoc way of measuring UI generosity. For a
more general and principled approach see Pallage et al. (2013).
32The vertical axis in panel (c) is scaled differently to make this effect visible.
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Figure 4: Maximum Welfare as a Function of UI Generosity
Note: Highest welfare normalized to 1. Generosity Γ(s) is given by replacement ratio times benefit
duration.
levels of generosity. For Γ(0) ≤ 9 and Γ(1) ≤ 4.8, welfare levels within 0.5% of the optimum
are attainable. Many actual UI systems fall into this area, and the Canadian EI system with
generosities between 4.5 and 5.7 is not far off.33
It is tempting to search for the welfare-maximizing combination of the UI parameters
ρ(s) and d(s). However, allowing both replacement ratios and benefit durations to vary
at the same time yields one of two degenerate, albeit perfectly sensible, solutions to the
optimization problem.
One possibility is that it is optimal to choose a very low replacement ratio to reduce
the adverse effects on the rate of job acceptance. Once the moral hazard problem is dealt
with in this way, however, there is no need to restrict the benefit duration any more. As
a consequence, a system under which households can receive a very low benefit indefinitely
may be optimal.34
33This does not imply, of course, that EI does lead to welfare close to the optimum. It just means that
potential efficiency is not made impossible by excessive generosity.
34Pollak (2007) argues that it would be preferable to provide these benefits in the form of fixed social
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The other possibility is given by the opposite limiting case along the duration dimension.
As the negative incentive effects of effectively paying agents for being unemployed can be
reduced for any given level of generosity by reducing the benefit duration and increasing the
replacement ratio accordingly, it may be optimal to choose a fixed one-time payment at the
time of separation.35 In the case of our discrete-time model, the best benefit duration would
therefore be one period. In this scenario, moral hazard effects are so strong that agents are
willing to give up insurance against unexpectedly long unemployment durations in favour of
a mechanism that merely compensates them for the expected cost of job loss.
Table 4 compares Canadian EI to six alternative systems. These six systems are catego-
rized as belonging to three classes. For each class, the optimal system is listed along with
a “constrained optimal” one, meaning the optimal system under the additional constraint
that there is no differentiation based on the state of the economy.
The first class of UI systems does not limit benefit duration, d(s) = ∞. It turns out
that this class contains the global optimum for all UI systems considered. The second class
requires benefit durations of at least three months and replacement ratios of at least 20%.
There is nothing special about these threshold values, except that they correspond to the
grid values used in the computations presented above. This means that the optimal systems
in this class are those shown in figures 3 and 4 above. Moreover, the lower bounds imposed
exclude corner cases and limit the set of UI systems to those that look like and have the
trade-offs of the majority of actual UI systems. Finally, the third class, labelled d(s) → 0,
sets the benefit duration to the lowest possible value of one period, practically converting UI
into a severance-pay-like system with a one-time payment in the first period after job loss.
This class contains a local optimum.
assistance payments that are independent of previous earnings.
35Another effect that works towards making a one-time payment preferable is a discounting or interest
effect. Everything else equal, households prefer to get payments earlier. To the government it does not
matter whether it pays households today or tomorrow, because in either case it is just redistributing from
one group to another. This effect arises in part because we are comparing steady states without taking into
account the one-time expenditure or revenue resulting from the introduction of the system.
20
Table 4: Optimal UI
Canadian EI d(s) =∞ ρ(s) ≥ 20% and d(s) ≥ 3 d(s)→ 0
optimal constr. optimal optimal constr. optimal optimal constr. optimal
ρ(0) a 55% 5.0% 4.0% 40% 30% 260% 160%
ρ(1) a 55% 2.5% 4.0% 30% 30% 135% 160%
d(0) (months) 10.1 ∞ ∞ 3 3 12 12
d(1) (months) 9.2 ∞ ∞ 3 3 12 12
welfare change (total) – 0.776% 0.774% 0.645% 0.642% 0.691% 0.686%
welfare change (s = 0) – 0.639% 0.480% 0.574% 0.373% 1.046% 0.474%
unemploymentb 9.87%/7.13% 7.18%/5.06% 7.16%/5.14% 7.57%/5.32% 7.41%/5.32% 7.36%/5.11% 7.19%/5.15%
market tightnessb 0.90/1.00 1.35/1.47 1.37/1.44 1.27/1.39 1.31/1.39 1.32/1.46 1.38/1.45
consumption 7.68 7.80 7.80 7.81 7.79 7.80 7.80
tax rate 4.05% 0.48% 0.55% 1.51% 1.46% 1.74% 1.81%
match quality 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07
a ρ(s) is determined with the following accuracy: 0.5% in the d(s) =∞ cases, 5% otherwise.
b bad state/good state
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The optimal UI systems in each of the classes show substantial differentiation in benefits
depending on the state of the economy, which is in line with the findings in the theoretical
literature, including Landais et al. (2010) and Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011). In the d(s) =
∞ and d(s)→ 0 scenarios, payments that occur during recessions are twice as high as in the
good state. The fact that none of the optimal systems shown in table 4 shows differentiation
along the duration dimensions does not mean that such a feature is never desirable for a UI
system. In fact, if one were to constrain the replacement ratio in both states to the same
value, it would typically be optimal to have longer benefit durations during recessions.36 The
resulting system would be qualitatively similar to EI.
A striking observation that can be made in table 4 is how little the efficient response of
UI generosity to the state of the economy actually matters for welfare. While it is possible
to improve welfare significantly over the status quo in the steady state – by as much as
0.776% when choosing the globally optimal policy – allowing for state-dependent benefits
leads to improvements of less than a hundredth of a percent. Efficiency gains of this order
of magnitude are almost certainly unnoticeable, and they are dwarfed by the effects of other
choices regarding the design of the UI system.37
Even when only the welfare changes in the bad state are considered, implementing the
constrained instead of the fully optimal system typically costs only about 0.2% in welfare.
The exception is the d(s)→ 0 class of UI systems, where the high one-time payment in the
bad state is very welcome and improves welfare during recessions by almost 0.6% compared
to constrained optimal policy.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between benefit duration and welfare for a given level of
generosity Γ(s) = ρ(s)d(s) for a constrained UI system. Starting at the constrained optimal
36Among the UI systems on the grid described in footnote 30 above, the best system with ρ(0) = ρ(1) =
20% is the one with d(0) = 12 and d(1) = 3 months. The best constrained system is d(0) = d(1) = 3 months.
The welfare difference between these two is less than a hundredth of a percent.
37Given the small differences in welfare among similarly parametrizes UI systems, the accuracy of the
simulations was increased by about a factor of 3 compared to the values reported in table 3 when searching
for the optimal systems reported in columns 2-7 of table 4. This was done by running ten simulations
with different starting values of the general equilibrium parameters for each UI parameter combination and
averaging the results.
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system in the d(s) → 0 class, benefit duration is expanded up to a maximum of 18 months
while the replacement ratios are reduced proportionally. The resulting U-shaped relationship
clearly shows that the most efficient systems are associated with either very short benefit
durations or very low replacement ratios.38
Figure 5: Welfare as a Function of Benefit Duration for Constant Generosity
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Note: Generosity Γ(s) = ρ(s)d(s) = 0.8 for s ∈ {0, 1}. The system with the lowest possible benefit duration
of d(0) = d(1) = 12 is the constrained optimum on the d(s)→ 0 class in table 4, the welfare of which is
normalized to unity in the figure. The system with the longest benefit duration under consideration (18
months) and the corresponding replacement ratio of ρ(0) = ρ(1) = 4.4% is comparable to the constrained
optimum in the d(s) =∞ class.
While these calculations qualitatively confirm the results of Andersen and Svarer (2010)
and Landais et al. (2010) that increased UI generosity during recessions is desirable in
principle, they also suggest that given the limited impact of this feature of the UI system, it
may be better to look elsewhere for efficiency improvements.
One last point that can be made based on the simulations presented in this section is
that there appears to be a tight relationship between the unemployment rate and welfare
over a range of policy parameters. While this close and over a wide range nearly linear
38Figure 5 is not as smooth as one might expect. The reason for this is solely the welfare criterion used.
Alternative welfare measure such as utilitarian welfare of the whole population or average expected lifetime
utility produce much smoother curves.
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relationship must break down in the neighbourhood of an interior optimum, it still appears
that the unemployment rate is a good indicator for the quality of a UI system at the levels
of generosity typically implemented.
Figure 6: Welfare vs. Unemployment for a Range of UI Policies
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Note: Welfare and unemployment outcomes for the 961 UI policies described in footnote 30.
5.2 A Region-Based Model of the Canadian Economy
This subsection is concerned with modelling regional differences in labour markets. For
the purpose of assessing the properties of EI, this is important for two reasons. The first rea-
son is that EI conditions benefits on regional unemployment rates; consequently, considering
only aggregate unemployment rates and one uniform UI policy is likely to give a distorted
picture of the implications of existing EI rules. Secondly, unemployment rates differ sub-
stantially across regions. Official regional unemployment rates in January 2013 ranged from
3.9% in Central Quebec to 31.3% in Northern Manitoba. Since any UI system is likely to
have very different effects across these highly heterogeneous regions, it is crucial to consider
unemployment levels and dynamics at the regional level to get a more accurate picture of
the EI system overall.
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The goal is to assess the implications of the EI system for welfare and inter-regional
redistribution considering business cycle effects. The results may shed light on political
economy issues related to the design of the system, as highlighted by Pallage and Zimmer-
mann (2005b).
The model is calibrated to match EI economic regions 1 to 55.39 Using monthly data
on regional unemployment rates since July 2000,40 each observation is classified into one of
six groups corresponding to the six unemployment rate brackets associated with different
maximum benefit durations. This classification is based only on unemployment rates during
the good state. During the bad state, unemployment rates are typically higher, putting the
same set of regions into a different EI bracket with different benefit conditions. The labour
market variables for the six groups of EI economic regions are then calibrated analogously
to the aggregate simulation discussed above. The necessary data on regional unemployment
rates, unemployment durations and labour market sizes is generated from the microdata
set of the Labour Force Survey, on which the official provincial and regional unemployment
figures reported by Statistics Canada and HRSDC are based as well.41 The details of the cal-
ibration, to the extent that they differ from the calibration of the aggregate model discussed
above, are summarized in table 5.42
Using these calibrated regional models, the effects of alternative benefit durations on
welfare are analyzed as follows. A UI system with a constant (i.e. time and region invariant)
benefit duration of 36 weeks, corresponding to the lowest duration actually used in Canada,
is taken as the base scenario. Three alternative scenarios are considered. A “business
cycle only” scenario only allows for an increase of benefit durations from 36 to 40 weeks
39This excludes the three territories with a combined population of less than 120,000.
40In July 2000, EI economic regions were redefined and their number was increased slightly.
41The calibration is based only on the microdata available in the Labour Force Survey. As a consequence,
the unemployment figures used are consistent with those reported by Statistics Canada, not those used by
HRSDC, which, as mentioned in footnote 4 above, differ slightly in their definition.
42The only difference in the calibration of the six groups of regions compared to the aggregate calibration
is the use of regional average unemployment rates and unemployment durations. The size of the labour force
in each region is used to aggregate the 55 regions into the six groups. The unemployment rates in the good
state for the six groups are 4.86%, 6.50% 7.50%, 8.50% 9.50% and 13.2%. The unemployment durations are
10.8, 13.2, 14.3, 15.7, 15.5, and 14.3 weeks.
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Table 5: Calibration: Groups of EI Economic Regions
parameter
valuea
< 6% 6− 7% 7− 8% 8− 9% 9− 10% > 10%
ω(1) 2.784 0.415 0.279 0.203 0.196 0.184
λ(0) 1.37% 1.39% 1.42% 1.45% 1.62% 2.36%
λ(1) 0.73% 0.85% 0.92% 0.95% 1.10% 1.77%
k 0.463 0.555 0.609 0.644 0.582 0.432
a per period ( 124 year)
during recessions. A “region only” scenario introduces the regional differentiation of benefit
duration found in the EI system without allowing the generosity of UI to vary over time
with the business cycle. Finally, a scenario labelled “actual EI” combines both regional and
temporal variation of benefit durations, resembling the policy actually in place. For each of
these three alternative scenarios the welfare effect of switching to it from the base scenario
is reported for each type of economic region.
Most centrally administered UI systems redistribute income from low-unemployment to
high-unemployment regions, simply because they offer the same insurance for the same
price (i.e. contributions or payroll taxes) to people exposed to different unemployment risk
due to different regional labour market conditions. The Canadian system is even more
redistributional, as it offers better insurance for the same price to those living in high-risk
regions.
To highlight the oft-discussed distributional nature of the EI system, the welfare changes
explained above are reported for three different cases: The first case, termed “common tax
rate,” assumes that when switching from the base scenario to an alternative, UI tax rates are
adjusted equally in all regions to make sure the government budget remains balanced. The
case “pay own increment” refers to an experiment where each region adjusts its individual
tax rate to individually finance the extra cost of changing the UI system. This case eliminates
the distributional effect entirely. Finally, in the case “share own increment” the global tax
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rate is adjusted uniformly to share the cost of changing the policy in one group of regions at
a time. This case differs from the first one by essentially letting each group of regions decide
on their own UI system, taking the behaviour of the others as given, instead of looking at
the changes in all regions as a package.43
Figure 7 reports the results by scenario, region and case. The first panel shows the
welfare effects of increasing the benefit duration by four weeks during recessions. Clearly,
this is a desirable change for most groups of regions. The only exception is the group with
the lowest unemployment rate, for which the cost in the “common tax rate” case would be
too high because of the implied subsidies paid to other regions. However, as the “pay own
increment” case shows, each group of regions would independently switch to this temporally
differentiated system if that were possible.44
The other two panels show the welfare effects of switching to the regionally differentiated
system and the actual EI system with both regional and temporal differentiation. Even
though the last scenario combines the first two, it looks almost identical to the region-
only scenario. This is because the welfare effects associated with varying generosity over
the business cycle are an order of magnitude smaller than the distributional effects.45 The
findings regarding the welfare effects of the regional differentiation of EI are what one would
expect. Under a common tax rate, high-unemployment regions favour the existing system
while low-unemployment regions pay the cost. If each group of regions had to pay for
increasing UI generosity to the current level, all regions would prefer the base scenario.
This should not be surprising as even the base scenario is rather generous compared to
the optimum, as seen in the previous subsection. Finally, when faced with the option of
43Note that the values reported for the first and the third of these cases depend, among other things, on
the relative sizes of these groups of regions as well as their tax bases.
44Even though we know that the optimal UI system is more generous during recessions, this does not
mean that finding a positive welfare effect from temporal differentiation in the EI system necessarily was
to be expected. The results shown in the previous subsection suggested that even the baseline system is
more generous than the efficient system in the sense that a benefit duration of 36 weeks is likely longer than
optimal given the high replacement ratio of 55%. It would therefore not have been clear that extending the
benefit duration even further during recessions would be desirable.
45Notice the different scales on the three panels.
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Figure 7: Welfare Effects of Changing UI Policy, by Group of EI Economic Regions
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increasing the generosity of their own UI while sharing the costs countrywide, all groups
of regions will do this. What is perhaps most surprising about these results is the scale of
the welfare effect. The costs or benefits of choosing the actual EI system over the baseline
scenario are between -0.2% and 0.2%, likely too small to notice. Consistent with the findings
reported in the previous section, the business cycle component of the welfare effect is small
enough to be considered irrelevant.
Figure 8 compares the same scenarios as figure 7, aggregating by province instead of
groups of regions.46 As before, qualitatively the findings are what one would expect: The
welfare effect of temporal differentiation is generally positive but very small.47 The Atlantic
Provinces and Quebec prefer EI to the baseline system, the western provinces do not, and
Ontario is highly representative of the whole country. A measure of the welfare-relevant dis-
46Note that the provincial results are not merely convex combinations of the results reported by group of
region. For example, the proper interpretation of the “share own increment” case is now: “What happened
if province X switched to the differentiated EI system, sharing the cost of the change countrywide?”
47In response to the 2008-09 recession, the federal government uniformly extended benefit durations by
five weeks for all eligible individuals as a discretionary and temporary measure. (This basically added five
weeks to all non-zero values in table 1.) The measure, which extended a local policy experiment to the whole
country, was effective for 18 months starting in March 2009. Our results suggest that the welfare effect of
this measure was likely positive and almost certainly tiny.
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Figure 8: Welfare Effects of Changing UI Policy, by Province
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Note: For each province, its weight based on the size of tis labour market is reported.
tribution inherent in the system is the difference between the welfare effects in the “common
tax rate” case and the “pay own increment” case48, i.e. the difference between the black and
the grey bars in figures 7 and 8. This distributional effect is positive for all provinces east of
Ontario, and negative for the rest of the country. Still, the effect is rather small in absolute
terms, and also small compared to the total distribution brought about by the system.49
6 Summary and Conclusions
This paper presented a general equilibrium model of life cycle behaviour under labour
market frictions calibrated to resemble the Canadian economy.
Simulations of a wide range of UI policies have shown that optimal systems exhibit
large changes in generosity with the business cycle and the state of the labour market, with
48The difference between the actual welfare cost of the differentiated system under a shared tax burden and
the welfare change that would result if provinces implemented the system without any change in transfers.
49Balancing the EI budget on a per-province basis instead of partly sharing the cost though a common tax
rate would change welfare in the provinces by between -3.29% (Prince Edward Island) and 1.02% (Manitoba).
The effects that can be attributed to the regional differentiation of the system are less than 110 of this in
magnitude.
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benefits being as much as twice as high during recessions. The variation of the benefit
duration as opposed to the replacement ratio as seen in the EI system can be an adequate
way of providing better insurance during downturns; the actual change in benefit durations
over the business cycle possible under the Canadian system is far less aggressive than under
optimal policies, however.
Even though our simulations confirm the theoretical prediction that increased UI gen-
erosity during recessions improves welfare, they also show that the quantitative importance
of responding efficiently to the state of the economy is extremely small. Both for optimal
systems and the actual EI system, the welfare improvement from varying benefit generosity
over time is measured in hundredths of percent at most, two orders of magnitude smaller
than the efficiency improvements that can be achieved by much simpler policy changes such
as adjusting replacement ratios or benefit durations without any conditioning on the current
state of the economy.
We also used the model to assess the distributional implications of the model both across
groups of similar regions and across provinces in terms of welfare. The patterns that emerge
match very closely what one would expect simply based on the benefits-to-contributions ra-
tios reported by HRSDC:50 The Atlantic Provinces and Quebec benefit from the more gen-
erous treatment of high-unemployment regions, whereas Ontario and the western provinces
suffer a reduction in welfare. Even though the distributional effects of the system are more
important than the insurance they provide against business cycle effects, they are still quite
small - none of the net payers among the provinces suffers a welfare reduction of more than
0.15% and none of the net recipients gains more than 0.18% from regional differentiation.
Given these rather insignificant welfare effects, it is probably fair to say that the main value
of the unique and rather complex Canadian EI system must be in its political or symbolic
functions rather than its economic effects.
50See EI Monitoring and Assessment Report 2012, Annex 2.19.
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Appendix
A The Household’s Problem
The Bellman equation characterizing a the problem of an unemployed household of age
g in period t that has at least one more period in the labour market left is given by
V ug (ait, bit, dit, st) = max
ait+1,m
(
u(ait + y
u(bit, dit)− ait+1
1 + r
)+
βF (m)Et[V
u
g+1(ait+1, bit, dit+1, st+1)]+
β
∫ ∞
m
Et[V
e
g+1(ait+1, m˜(m,m), st+1)]dF (m)
)
.
(A.1)
Here bit is the individual’s benefit amount or last wage, which is determined upon job loss.
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dit encodes the remaining benefit duration.
52 Given these two variables, it is possible to
determine the actual benefit payment yu(b, d). The reservation match quality an agent
chooses given her current situation is m. F (m) is the distribution function of the best match
quality offered per period.
If the agent receives a job offer with an acceptable match quality m ≥ m, Nash bargaining
takes place over the share of the output that is paid as a wage. Given the agent’s bargaining
power , the value m˜(m,m) = m+(m−m) could be interpreted as the job’s effective match
quality from the agent’s perspective, a measure that accounts for the fact that part of the
labour share will go to the firm.
The maximization problem of an employed agent of age g who is not yet about to retire
51bit = 0 for agents who have never had a job and are therefore not entitled to receive benefits.
52This variable may, however, also be used to determine whether the agent is in his waiting period.
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is
V eg (ait, m˜it, st) = max
ait+1
(
u(ait + y
e(m˜it, st, g)− ait+1
1 + r
)+
β(1− λ)Et[V eg+1(ait+1, m˜it, st+1)]+
βλEt[V
u
g+1(ait+1, b(m˜it, st, g), d(st), st+1)]
)
.
(A.2)
The household’s labour income is ye(m˜it, st, g) = (1 − α)
(
α
r+δ
) α
1−α p(st)
1
1−α m˜q(g), where
q(g) = qit is the agent’s age-dependent productivity. If the job is destroyed at the end of
the period, the agent’s entitlement to UI benefits is determined as a function of her current
income and the macro state, bit+1 = b(m˜it, st, g) and dit = d(st).
A retired individual’s problem is simple and deterministic.
Vg(ait) = max
ait+1
(
u(ait − ait+1
1 + r
) + βVg+1(ait+1)
)
, (A.3)
where Vg(ait) ≡ 0 if the age g exceeds the agent’s life span.
B Calibration
All data on the Canadian economy used in the calibration comes from Statistics Canada.
The real interest rate was calculated as the average 10-year yield of Government of
Canada marketable bonds from 2000:7 to 2012:12 minus CPI inflation.53
Recession quarters since 1976 were determined using chain-weighted seasonally adjusted
GDP54 data as periods with at least two consecutive drops in GDP. This procedure identified
four recessions55 accounting for 15 out of the 150 quarters under consideration.
The average increase in the national unemployment rate during months that fall into
recession quarters was 0.25%. In all scenarios under consideration, λ(0) was chosen to
match this value. The matching rate ω(1) was calibrated to make the model match the
53series v122487 and v41690914
54series v1992067 and v62305752
551980:Q2-1980:Q3, 1981:Q3-1982:Q4, 1990:Q2-1991:Q1 and 2008:Q4-2009:Q2
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average unemployment rate in non-recession months between 2000:7 and 2012:12, either at
the national level or for groups of regions.
The productivity drop during recessions was calculated based on annual multifactor pro-
ductivity (MFP) estimates56 using the following regression:
lnMFPt = β0 + β1t+ β2t
2 + β3RQt,
where RQt ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} is the share of recession quarters in year t. The value
exp(β3) = 0.949 is the relative productivity during recessions.
Statistics Canada does not publish employment-related data by EI economic region,57
so some time series had to be constructed directly from the Labour Force Survey (LFS)
microdata set.58 Labour force size, unemployment rate and unemployment duration series
were constructed by region and month for EI regions 1 to 55 and 2000:7 to 2012:12. All series
were seasonally adjusted. The labour force size was used for aggregating the regions into six
groups and to compute national averages. The unemployment rates and durations by group
of regions were used to calibrate the regional models. The national average of unemployment
duration was also used in the calibration of the model to the aggregate Canadian economy.
C Model Solution and Simulation
The household’s problem is solved by numerical dynamic programming, starting at the
final period (number 1,440) and proceeding backward to the first. Value functions are rep-
resented on a multi-dimensional grid, using linear interpolation.59
56series v41712881
57There are data by “economic region,” but the definition of regions used by Statistics Canada does not
match EI economic regions.
58The public-use file of the LFS does not contain geographic information that is more detailed than
provinces. Access to the full dataset I used is restricted.
59An exception to this rule are intervals in which the value function reaches its infimum, −∞ for our
parametrization. In this case, a non-linear function with the proper asymptotic behaviour is used. Even
though linear interpolation may appear inferior to more sophisticated interpolation techniques such as higher
order splines, its simplicity makes it so much faster that it becomes possible to use much finer grids in the
computation, resulting improved accuracy.
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These grids are given by AG×MG×SG for employed agents, AG×BG×UG×SG for
unemployed agents and just AG for retired agents. The possible macro states are represented
by SG ∈ {0, 1}. AG is the asset grid for values of ait ≥ 0. It is composed of a linearly spaced
section close to zero and a geometrically spaced section for higher asset levels. It has up to
497 nodes, although the grids for younger agents omit some of the higher nodes that cannot
be reached to save space and computation time. MG represents levels of match quality. It
has 15 nodes at the midpoints of their respective quantiles plus three extra nodes at 50% and
75% of the lowest and 150% of the highest quantile nodes. The benefit grid BG is a 19-point
grid derived from MG, but adjusted to cover the whole relevant range of wages across age
groups. Finally, UG represents the remaining benefit duration as well as special states such
as being in the waiting period. Its size depends on the maximum benefit duration and the
complexity of the rules, but it is typically 7 nodes or less.
To solve the optimization problem of unemployed households, it is necessary to calculate
the expectation over the continuous match quality variable m as shown in equation A.1 in
appendix A. This is done using a quadrature-like approach, based on the grid points MG
chosen along this dimension and using the appropriate probability weights.
Solving the general equilibrium problem involves finding the levels of market tightness
θ(0), θ(1) that yield zero expected profits for jobs created in the bad and the good state,
respectively. It also requires finding the tax rate that balances the government’s budget. To
solve for the market tightness, I start from a reasonable guess, solve the household’s problem
for the implied job offer rates ω(s), and then simulate the economy for a large number
of periods to calculate aggregate variables, including the firms’ profits. If the zero-profit
condition is not met with the required accuracy, I update my guesses of θ(s) and start over.
In most scenarios, it takes about 5-10 of these iterations to determine market tightness.
All these computations are done for a tax rate of zero. Once the equilibrium market
tightness has been determined, it is straightforward to calculate the tax rate required to
balance the government budget based on measured expenditures and the tax base. All that
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needs to be done at this point is to adjust some of the results, including consumption and
welfare measures, for the tax rate. This can be done so easily because the preferences are
CRRA and the tax base includes all sources of household income except interest.
Solving the household’s problem for a typical set of parameters takes about 1-2 minutes
(on one processor core) and requires approximately 2GB of memory. Given the large extent
of the history simulated based on the household’s behaviour (see footnote 24), this part of
the computation takes much longer, approximately 10-20 minutes. It thus takes about 1-2
hours to solve the full general equilibrium model for one set of policy parameters.60
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